This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the loglikelihood ratio l rather than the log-ratio measure r as "the one true measure of confirmation."
Introduction.
Peter Milne (1996) shows that
r(H, E, B) p log [Pr (HFE ∩ B)/ Pr (HFB)]
is "the one true measure of confirmation" in the sense that r is the one and only function satisfying the following five constraints on measures of confirmation C.
C(H, E, B) 0 iff Pr (HFE ∩ B) Pr (HFB). 2. is a function that the values and C(H, E, B)
P r ( XFB) Pr( YFZ ∩ B) assume on the at most sixteen truth-functional combinations X, Y, Z of E and H.
3a. If and , then Pr (EFH ∩ B) ! Pr (FFH ∩ B) P r( EFB) p Pr (FFB) C(H, E, B) ≥ C(H, F, B). 3b. If and , then Pr (EFH ∩ B) p Pr (FFH ∩ B) P r( EFB) ! Pr (FFB) C(H, E, B) ≥ C(H, F, B). 4a. is determined by and the C(H, E ∩ F, B) Ϫ C(H, E ∩ G, B) C(H, E, B) difference . C(H, F, E ∩ B) Ϫ C(H, G, E ∩ B)
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Among these constraints, 1, 3, and 5 concern the relation between confirmation and probability, while 2 and 4 concern confirmation alone. I will only be concerned with the former. Constraint 1 is logically equivalent to . Let us see where this shift in focus takes us. Pr (EFH ∩ B) Regarding Constraint 3a Milne (1996, 21) states that it "corresponds more or less to the claim . . . that, other things being equal, a theory is better confirmed by evidence the more likely the theory makes the evidence." More than one thing can be equal, though. Often not all of them can be equal simultaneously. According to Constraint 3a, the prior of the evidence is held fixed: is equal to . Pr (EFB) P r ( FFB) Consider the catch-all counterpart 3a*. If and ,Pr
C(H, E, B) ≤ C(H, F, B)
According to 3a*, the catch-all, the likelihood of on the evidence, is held H fixed:
is equal to . Given that the theory makesPr (EFH ∩ B) P r ( FFH ∩ B) the one evidence more likely than the other, that is, Pr (EFH ∩ B) ! , not both of these other things can be equal.
Pr (FFH ∩ B)
Regarding Constraint 5, Milne says that it "is a weak consequence of the Likelihood Principle" (1996, 22) :
In comparing the evidential bearing (relative to background knowledge B) of E on the hypotheses H and T we need consider only and .
Pr (EFH ∩ B)
Pr(EFT ∩ B)
Note that, in the presence of Constraints 1-4, Constraint 5 is equivalent to the otherwise stronger
and Pr (EFB) p Pr (FFB), then
C(H, E, B) p C(T, F, B).
This is so because satisfies 5 ϩ .
r(H, E, B)
Here is the catch-all counterpart of 5
Let us rename Constraints 2 and 4 by 2* and 4*, respectively. Then things can be put as follows. In the presence of Constraints 2 and 4, the conjunction of Constraints 1, 3, and 5 says that is a function of
, and the prior of E, -Pr (EFH ∩ B) P r ( EFB) increasing with the former, and decreasing with the latter.
In the presence of 2* and 4*, the conjunction of 1*, 3*, and 5* says that is a function of the likelihood of H on E, ,
C(H, E, B)
P r ( EFH ∩ B) and the catch-all, that is, the likelihood of on E, -in-H Pr (EFH ∩ B) creasing with the former, and decreasing with the latter.
Catch-Alls or Priors? A variation variation of Milne's proof (presented in Appendix 1) shows thatl (H, E, B) p log [Pr (EFH ∩ B)/ Pr (EFH ∩ B)]
is another true measure of confirmation in the sense that l is the one and only function satisfying 1*-5*.
As Fitelson (2001, 29) observes, l satisfies 1-4. It is worth noting that r satisfies 1*-4*. So the difference between r and l lies in 5 versus 5*: l does not satisfy 5, and r does not satisfy 5*.
Thus r and l agree that confirmation depends on the likelihood of H on E, , and one other factor. They also agree on how to Pr (EFH ∩ B) compare the likelihood of H on E to the other factor, namely, by taking logarithms of ratios. What they disagree about is the other factor the likelihoods of H on E should be compared to: r says the other factor is the prior of the evidence E, , while l says it is the catch- Seen this way r and l agree that it is differences between priors and posteriors that matter for confirmation. They also agree on how to measure those differences, viz., by taking the logarithm of the ratio of posterior over prior. What they disagree about is, to speak with Joyce (2003, Section 3) , the question whether we should consider differences in "total evidence" as measured by and , or differences in "net eviPr (HFE ∩ B) Pr( HFB) dence" as measured by and .
O(HFE ∩ B) O(HFB)
4. Conclusion. Milne (1996) presents his argument as a desideratum/explicatum argument for r as opposed to other measures of confirmation. His confirmation theoretic monism presupposes that there is one and only one true measure of confirmation. Joyce (2003, Section 3), on the other hand, favors a confirmation theoretic pluralism according to which, among others, each of r and l "measures an important evidential relationship, but that the relationships they measure are importantly different." 1 This pluralistic view suggests to view Milne's (1996) argument and the above variation not so much as arguments for or against one particular measure of confirmation. Rather, they can be viewed as characterizations that tell us, descriptively, what particular measures focus on, without telling us, prescriptively, what we should focus on. The latter, normative question seems to be beyond the reach of desiderata/explicata approaches, but to belong to the realm of means-ends epistemology or epistemic consequentialism (Percival 2002; Stalnaker 2002) as exemplified, for probability, by Joyce (1998) , and for confirmation, by Huber (2005) .
Appendix 1: A Variation of Milne's (1996) Proof
The following proof is entirely due to Milne 1996 , that is, r and l without the log.
Constraint 1* entails that for all . As
Constraint 4* entails that there is a possibly partial such
The range of is assumed to be a real interval. , and so
which yields and for and (2) and the previous equation give us 1
If
, then and , or (y, w) x/z p , and so for somē
This and Equation (1) give us
which yields
v).
For integers and in the range of F so that is in m, n u7 m/n (t, u 7 m/n) the domain of G, we thus have . Constraint G(t, u 7 m/n) p (m/n) 7 G(t, u) 3a* entails that if . So for all reals r with in the
is in the domain of , . (t, u 7 r) G G(t, u 7 r) p r 7 G(t, u) Hence for some (at this point Milne refers G(t, u) p u 7 g(t) g: ᑬ* r ᑬ ≥0 to Aczél 1966, 31-34) . Fitelson (2001, 28) notes that "Milne's argument implicitly requires that the probability function . . . satisfy some rather strong, unmotivated, Pr and unintuitive constraints." In particular, "Milne's argument makes use of certain theorems . . . which force the probability function (and, Pr hence, the spaces over which the measure [of confirmation ] is defined) C to satisfy various kinds of continuity conditions" (Fitelson 2001, 28, note 43) . For a discussion of these conditions Fitelson refers to Halpern 1999a Halpern , 1999b , where it is shown that Cox's (1946) theorem does not hold in finite domains.
Appendix 2: Fitelson's (2001) Objection
I think it is perfectly reasonable for Milne (and proponents of the above variation of his argument) to require the domain of the measure of confirmation to be infinite. As Halpern (1999a, Section 5; 1999b, Theorem C 5) observes, one response is to say that we are not interested in a single domain in isolation, but a notion of belief or confirmation (in his or our case, respectively) that applies uniformly in all domains.
But suppose we are in fact interested in just one single field of propositions over which our measure of confirmation is defined. Suppose A C further is finite. Even then the domain of is uncountable, provided A C we assume does not vary with the underlying probability measure .
C Pr That is, we only have to think of as a mapping of probability spaces C (and not propositions without probabilities) into the reals, and take its domain to be the set of all probability spaces (for the fixed AA, PrS A from above). As far as I can tell, this assumption is implicit in all discussions of incremental confirmation. Rejecting it means to use different measures of confirmation for different probability measures on one fixed domain, rather than uniformly using the same measure of confirmation.
However, the assumption Milne (1996, 24) actually makes is that the range of forms a real interval. This implies that the domain of is C C uncountably infinite. As argued, the latter assumption is reasonable for Milne to make. Obviously it is another question whether the former is, too.
